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on 6 Febnuary 1984 the CounciL (Economic and FjnanciaL Affairs) decided to
hoLdadiscussionont2Marchonthesuccesssofarachievedbymonetary
cooperation in er.op., on the uasii of a document prepaned by the commission
in-iontrLtation  witn tf'e Monetary committee"




the EMS has proved a usefuL instrument for the orderLy management of
exchange-rate  PoLi cies"
I"
A.TheEMshasstrengthenedpoLicycoordinationprocedurestoasignificant
but stiLL Limited extent"
AmonetarysystemwhosepurposejstoestabLishazoneofstabiLityin
Europe n".ur'r..i ly impLi"t -ii"-.iot" 
coordination of poLicies which'
operating ,pri.""r,  can intir"n." the parities of the participating
currencies"
1.IIe-E[9-hag-giy9n.9989te!9,9-19-ggEEgnl!y-Pl999dg!99
The community coordination  and monitoring system was defined in its
essentiaLs by the councii'Jr-iizl-1";isions  on convergence. untiL the
EMswassetup,theseproceduresremainedLargelyamatteroffonm"
since l9lg-tiZy have taken on a new meaning :
nationaLpoLicieshavecomecLosertogetherintheirbroadagreement






become the prime "..;;;;;;'tJ.-ir'" 
ctose examination  and adaptation
of nationaL economi. p"iilies  aLong paths of convergence'
"/ ""
(1)  COM(84) 125
KOMMISSIONEN  FOR DE EUROP€ISKE  FIELLESSKABER - ](OMMISSIOT'I  DER EUROPAISCHEN  GEMEINSCHAFTEN
coMt,ltsstoN or rHe eunopin'ri;bMMuNtIEs - cq44ssror.r oes cot',trr,rtrxnr,nes euRopeEruNrs  - En[PonH  Tc]N EYPonAKcN  KolNorHTcN
d6rr,rrr,iiSSiOruioete cOuurvri-eunopeE  - COi/tMSSlE  VAN tE EUROPESE  GEMEENSCHAPPEN-2
2. I!s-:geps-eJ-e!!ige!!en:-!n-!!e-d!rsg!!en-sl-ggnyerssnse-$[e!ns-!!s!!ed
(i)The uLtimate responsibitity for the conduct of economic poticy quite
c learty remains in the hands of the fvlember States"
(ii)The EMS has brought about the concerting of monetary poLicies but has
not yet resuLted in any such c[ose coordination of other poLicies which
nevertheLess  have a direct infIuence on monetary deveLopments, such
as pubLic defic'it management or income and cost trends in nomina[
terms"
(iii)the  convergence of monetany policies themse[ves has been Iimited by
two specific factors :  continuing restrictions in severaI Member
States to the free movement of capitaL; and the avaiLabiLity of
credits without strings on intennationaL financiaI markets, which
has made it  possibte to avoid using the conditionat credit faciIities
of the EMS (with the exception of the Community  borrowings facitity,
which was used in June 1983).
B.  The resutts
1 " Ihe-EU!-bes-seds-e-pesi!ive-sgn!ribs!ren-!e-!!e-s!sEi!!!r-gJ-srs!s!ee
!e!99
Despite the unstabte internationaL monetary environment (with the
second oiI  shock and the rise of the dotLar since 1979), the EMS has
succeeded in dampening the vo[atiIity of exchange rates between the
participating currencies :
-  between 1979 and 1983, the average month-to-month ftuctuations against
the German mark of the othen seven EMS currencies ranged from 0.52
to 4.8%, whereas the US do[[ar, the yen and sterting fLuctuated aga'inst
the German mark by between 2"4% and ?"7%i
-  the average month -tornonth movement in the effective exchange rate
of the EMS currencies  ranged from 1"2% to 1"5% over the period
1979-83, whereas the do[[ar, the yen and sterLing moved by between
2"3% and 2.8'/.;
-  since March 1979 there have been seven reaIignment operations"
In a[L of them, the parity changes were in the direction suggested by
basic economic trends" Fron 1979 to 1983, the maximum spread of the
deviations from the medium-term trend of the real exchange rates of
the German mark, the French franc, the Itatian [ira and the Irish pound
against the other four participating currencies was hal.f the spread
3?:FiJio,ll8l"JS'l"ls,1?3F:".3i'J|'fAl,gfis  ggxisfi;?!8 i[g+,.,g!".t[.0H.
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Over the Iast five years, success in reducing infLation has been Iimited"
Since 1983, howeven, the trend has been more favourabLe :  for the eight
countries part'icipating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism, the average
inf[ation wiLL have dropped fron 8% in 1979 to 6"1% in.1983 and wil.L
settte at 5% in'1984" The maximum spread was 11 points in 1979 GtaLy,
152; Netherlands,  4Z) and 12 points in 1983 (ItaLy, 14.7%; Nethertands,








The EMS mechanjsms must be examined from the aspects of their degnee of
response to the requirements of the system and the extent of their scope'
A.  The deqree of response of the mech?gisms
1 " !es-e!-!!s-Eg!
The ECUs received by the centraL banks as a counterpart to their goLd and
doLLar contributions.t" iilite  used" Their method of creation (revoLving
swap arrangements)  and the iir.tr"tions  in the amount of ECU issued
(whichdependsonthepriceofgoLdandtherateofthedoL[ar)makethem
precar.ior!-.ii.tr" Their l..imited acceptabi Lity (50% of the cLaim arising
from very short-term financing), the non-convertibitity of creditor"
positions,  and their Low yieti ith" ru.tage of the officiaL discount
rates) make them unattnactive as an asset"
About 80% of very short-term financing operations from 1979 to 1983 were
unwound without using the ECU; the aggregate  sum of settLements in Ecu
over the whoLe period *.r  Z O6O miLti;; eIU as aga'inst a totaL stock of
53 000 miLLion ECL! at the end of 1983'
Tosumi,rp,theECUasusedofficiaLLyisLesshighLyregardedasareserve
asset than as a iredit which must be settLed through other assets"
2" Elgbs!s9-3!d-i!!9lve!!i9!-E99,hslis!
Four-fifths of aLL interventions  by the centraL banks have been carried
out within the margins, befor. if'"'Limits for compuIsory intervention
were reached"
the mangins were for the most part carried out in
mark being the Community currency used to the greatest
This presents two major ProbLems  :
-  such interventions, often quite Legitimate, maynot atways serve the
coherence of the system;
-  the overwheLming use of the doLLar may be usefuL in some circumstances'
but it  may-.lro"rtrain the internaL equi Librium of the EMS"
3" gtvgls.elgg-ildigelg!
ThediVergenceindicatornowontyimperfectLyperformsthefunction
assigned [o'it,  for three main reasons:
-  technicaL shortcomings,  which make it  impossibLe to refLect perfectLy
theweightingsintheECUortoeLiminatetheinfLuenceexertedby
the variabitity of the curien.i"t incLuded in the ECU but not Linked
bY the 2 "25% nargin;
-the.importancegiven.inpracticetocertainbiLateraLexchangerate
re Lat i onsh'i Ps;
-thefactthatbreakingthroughthethreshotdisamuchweaker
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Parity changes are a part of the machinery of the system. Seven
reatignments is quite a large number, and the agreed spreads between the




Bt The scope of the mechanisE
The EMS stiLL has gaps"
1" It  does not incLude, or at
currenc i es"
Least not compIeteLy, aLI the Community
(a) Since 1979 the fluctuation marEin for the ItaLian [ira has been
fixed at 6%" Since that year the Italian authorities have been
pursuing a poticy for stabiLizing and even for sl.ightty raising the
reaI exchange rate of the Iira; but ItaLyrs l"imited success in
stabiIizing its  currency is probabIy partty due to the [esser pressure
towards adjustment exerted by the wfdespread of the Iirars
ftuctuation mangin.
(b) SterLing has never been part of the exchange and intervention
mechanism"  Atthough there are certain risks (but these couId be
overcome), the participation of sterLing wouLd present three
advantages :
competting  mechanisms making for common discipLine, convergence
and consoIidation of the common market;
-  it  wou[d add to the size and credibiLity of the EtvlS and increase its powers of negotiation vis-a-vis the outside wor[d;
-  it  would give the United Kingdom the great asset of a currency
forming part and parceI of a stabiLizing rnechanism  which
continuousty reftects economic fundamentals"
(c) The Greek drachma is also not a participant in the EFIS.
2" Jhs-syslsu::-erlerne!_rsleliens
There has been considerabte  improvement in the coordination of the policies of the EMS members vis-A-vis the other major currencies and jn
particirtar the dotLar :  the centraL banks keep each other regu[arty
informed; individuaL concerted measures for the management of foreign
exchange markets have been carried out;  and cohereni action in the face




to the hopes expressed in  the .Bremen 
and
the EMS has not yet managed to deveLop a common




-  the American authoritesr Lack of
rat ei
concern about the doILar exchange
-  the EMS membersr differing situations regarding the d9!!ar  :
doItar movements have difierent economic effects on different
countriesandoneEMscurrencyisareservecurrency.
3" Ibe-glesing-privegg-s9e-9J-!be-Egg
The ECUrs popuLarity with private transactors is growing" The short-term
ECU market is now reported to-ti.nO at 10 000 miLLion ECU; the voLume
of Long-term issues amounts to-i-iOO miLLion ECU; outstanding  medium-
term syndicated bank loans amount to 2 000 miLLion ECU"
TheCommission,jnacommunicationofMaylgs3(1),setoutthe
advantages it"iou'Ld expect from wider private use of the ECU" In any
event, its growing private use requires a more coordinated  response
to market requireilents  on the part of the Member States"
CONCLUSION  :
0n baLance, the fjrst  fiVe years of the EMS have been Large[y positive:
-  there has been progress towards the convergence of economic poIicies, even
though further conioLidation is needed;
-  qeneraLLY sPeaking, the
i$  ir'e." are sti L L ProbLems ':  intettuention Practi ce;
mechanisms have functioned satisfactorily' though
.t  tfgtrds the official  use of the ECU and
: not aLL the European currencies are participants'
regards non-Community  currencies are not yet
and spontaneous  expahsion of the private use of
to hindrance"
-  the sYstem stiLL has gaPs
exchange rate PoLicies as
suffi cient LY coordinated,
the ECU is stiLI subject
NB
(1)  cOM(83) 274 ot ?4 ttrav 1983 and P-45'
of the ECU""
: The Commissionrs main recent proposaLs in
fieLds:
The deveLopment of the European Monetary
18 March 1982
Financiat integration, C0M(83) 207 finaL
"Promotion of the internationaL rote
the monetarY  and financiaL
System, COM(82) 133 flnaL of
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BruxeLLes,  mars 1984
BILAN DE CINO ANNEES DE FONCTIONNEMENT  DU SYSTEME  MONETAIRE EUROPEEN (/)
principaux:
-  Le S.M.E. a 6t6 un
6conomiques,
-  Le S.M.E. a 6t6 un
Le ConseiL ECo/FIN du 6 fevrier 1984 a'd6cid6 dravoir' Lors de sa session
du 12 marsr rn" i'irrrrrion sur Le',biLan de La coop6ration mon6taire en
Europe,,, sur La base dr un docut";t ;;d;are par La 
'Commission' en consuLtation
avec Le Comit6 mon6taire'
La Commission a transmis au ConseiL une communication  6tabLissant [e biLan
de 5 ann6es de tonrlionnement  ar-E.m'E' ie Ui Lan comporte deux d€veLoppements
instrument efficace de convergence  des poLitiques
instrument ut'iLe drune gestion ordonn6e des changes'
I. !g S.M.E., instrument de convergence des poLitiques 6conomiques
A. Le S.M,E. a impos6 un renforcement siginificatifrnais encore Limit6
des proc6AJr"s-de coordination  des poLitiques.
Lal.ogiquedIunsystdmemon6ta.ireayantpourobjectjf[|etabLissement
d,une zone de stabiLit6 en';;;;;;  "'ri 
atirpor.r-une coordination 6troite
despoLitiquesquirenamont'peuventexerceruneinfLuencesurLa
paritd des monnaies' participantes'
1. !e-s"M:Ec 9 dolng de-Lg gu!s!a3c9 au1 prgcldurgs-commugagtaires  :
LesystemecommunautajredecoordinationetdesurveiLLancea,pour
IressentieL,6t6 d6fini o.i'r"r-agcisions  du conseiL de 1974 reLatives
d La convergence. .lusquii'tiinrirr.ation du S.M.E., ces proc6dures
6taient demeur6es Largement formeLLes- 
.iti"t 
ont, depuis 1979' acquis
une significatjon nouveLLe  :
.LesgrandesorientationsdespoLitiquesnationaLesseSontrappro.
ch6ei sur La n6cessiti"a"-poursuivre  un objectif de stabiLisation
des Prix ;
LaconcertationdespoLitiquesauseindesenceintescommunautaires
et notamment au comiie mon6taire, au comit6 des gouverneurs et au
conseiL, est devenue-une pratique syst6matique, rendue n6cessaire
p". i"  OiscipLine qurimpose Le S'M'E'
(t-) cov@'t) wS
KOMMISSIONEN  FoR DE EURoPIEISKE  FIELLESSK{B-EI ..IffiloN  DER EI"ROPAISCHEN  GEMEINSCHAFTEN
coMMrssroN  or r*e eunopinftil-MilLhrr-rEs - cour'rs5oiii  DEJboMMiALnEs  -Eunopeer.tres  - EnlrPonH  ToN EYPQtlAiKcx'l Kolr'lorHroi'l
$ililiB3bilj;elLE  b6prijr.rriA'EuRopEE  - coilainsse  vAN DE EURoPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN-2-
- Les opdnatiors de ndalignement  sont devenues , notamrflent  depuis
f6ynien 1982, une occasion pnivil6gi6e dlun examen de fqrd et
dlune adaptation des politiques 6conomiques nationales dans le
sens de la corvengence.
2.lgegr!{e-{.:-gPtjggige-tu-soty9t99!99ie-:t-e-!93!go:tr-ri!lJ'!9"-
- il est dtabond dvident que la nesponsabilit6 ultime dans la
conduite des politiques 6conomiques est demeun6e celle des
Etats
- le S. M.g  a ensuite impos6 une concentation 6troite des
politiques mon6taines,  mais nla pas encone entnafn6 une coordi-
nation aussi 6trolte dtautnes politiques, qui ont pq.Jrtant une
influence directe sur ll6volution mondtaine, quril slagisse des
d6ficits des budgets publics ou de lt6volution nominale des
nevenus et des co0ts ;
- enfin, la cornrengence des politiques mon6taines  elles.m8rnes
a 6td limitde pan dzux facteurs spdcifiques : le maintienrdans
plusieuns Etats membnes, de nestrictions A la libre circuldtion
des capitaux ; la possibilit6 d:un endettement inconditionnel sun
les manctr6s financiens intennationaux, qui a;anmis dl6viter
le necouns aux m6canismes de cr6dit conditionnels du S. M. E.
(exception faite du m€canisme des emprunts communautaineg,
utilis6 en juin 1983).
B. Les n6sultats obtenus
I .  L_._9:l!_A a_golltIPy Lp:{li"egfl L33g:Pi_tj!Lo_": !:t1I _te
-cl'-q!gg.
Malgn€  I linstabi litd de lrenvinonnement  mondtaine  intennational
(second droc p6tnolier - dvolutlon du $ depuis 1979... ), le
S. M.E  est panvenu A n6duine la vo[atiLitd des taux de change
entne les monnaies panticipantes :
- entne 1979 et 1983, en pnenant le D.M. comme r6f6rerre, les
vaniations moyennes dlun mois A ltautne des taux de change des
? autnes monnaies du S. M. E. ont 6t6 compnises  entne 0r 5^'dt
O,8 qla, alors que les vaniations du $, fu Yen et de la t  pant-
-3-
rappont du D. M. Se Situaient entne 2'4 el Z',? 0lo i
IavaniationmoyennedIunmoisstf||autnedutauxdechange
effectif des monnaies clu !;' M'E' sr€drelonne de l'2 a t'5 
0lo
sunIap6niode|9?9-1983'alorsqure||eestcompniseentre
2r3 et 2rg % PoLlr le $, le Yen et la C;
- depuis rnns lg|€, sept oP6rations de n6alignement sont inter-




ctrange n6els du D. M' , du FF' de la Lit et du Punt vis-b-vis
des 4 autnes monna|es Panticipantes, a 6t6 inf6rieune de moit|6 e
lfamplitude observ6e de l9?4 a l9?8' De la mAme manilre' les
.6cantspannaPpont.A|atendancedestauxdec|,rangen6e|sde
chacune des monnaies du 5' M'E vis€-vis de ltensemble  des
pnincipates monnaies ont 6t6 limit6s(entre 8r2 et 13, 1 ?o), alons





de n6duction de lrinf lation demeune limit6. Depuis 1983' la tendance
est cependant prus favorabre: pour res 8 pays panticipant au
m6canisme de change du s. M. E. , te taux moyen dtinf lation auna
baiss6 de 8 9o en l9?9 a 6' |  0lo en 1983' et sr6tabtina A 5 Io a  1984
||6cant maximum 6tait de ll  points en l9?9 (ttatie: 15 1o iPB 4 0lo|,
de l|poinrs'en  1983 (1t..: 14r? olo; PB z zr? ololi ildevnait atne
n6duit a 7,5 points en 1984 (lt' : lO' 6 olo i PB: 3'1 0lol'
Les m6canismes du S'M' E' doivent Stre examin6s
leun bonne adaptation'aux besoins du systBme' drune partt
de letrr champ dlapplication, dlautre pant'





t. , hlgtj!-"-.Jigf-0" !16g  l
Les €.cus que negoivent les banques centrales en contre pan'tie de
leurs apponts dlor et de $ sont Peu utitis6e. Leun mode de crcation
(cn6dits crois6s renowetables), et ltinstabilit6 de leun encour3
(li6s au pnix de llon et au couns du $  en font des actif5 pn6calnes
Leun acceptabilit6 limit6e (50 % de la cr6ance n6e dlun 'f frtancement
A trbs count tenme!, I rinconventibilit6  des positions cn6dltnlcast
leun faible rendement  (une moyenne des taux dlescompte officiels)'
en font un actif Peu attnayant.
80 gu envinon des op€nations de financement I  tnbs ccu:t
terme effectu6es de l9?9 a 1983 ont donc €t6 d6nou6es sans recours
b lrdcu I la somme cuniutaedes rdglements en 6cus pelr LrensembLe
de la p6niode est de 2 milLiards drdcus pour un stock total de
53 miLLiards dr6cus i  La fin de 1983.
Ll6cu officiel est en conclusim moins consid6r6 comme un
actif de n6senve que comme unr.cn6dit dont [e ndglement devra ttre
effectu6 au moyen dtautnes actifs.
2.it{.-egsil'--a-'-9!3199-e-t-gltrjglysl-oj'-
Les 4/kedu total des intenv€ntions  des banques centnales ont 6t6
ef fectuds A lrint6nieur des margesr avant que lec limiteE drinter-
vention obligatoine ne soient atteintes'
pour lressentielr les intenventions intra-marginales ont 6t6
ef f ectu6es en $, la monnaie conrmunautain6 la plue utilic6e 6tant
leD.M.
Cette'6volution pose deux problbmes pFincipaux  :
- de telles intenventions,  souvent l6gitimesr peuvent ne P65
toujouns senvir la coh6rence du systeme ;
- le neiq."rns pr6pond6nant au $ pzut se r6vElen utlle dans
centaines circonstances ; il peut ar.ssi nuine I  lrdquilibne
intenne du S M. E.
3.  Indicateun de divengence
divergence ne remplit plus qutimpanfaitement  la





.- des canences tedrniquesr QUI empactrent de nendre parfaiternent
compte des ponddnations  dans ll€ctt ou dt6liminen ltinf luence
o<enc6e pan les variations de monnaies incluses dans ll6cu mais
nonli6esentreellespanlamargede2'250loi
- lrimpontance accond€e dans la pnatique a certaines nelations de
ctrange bilat6nales  ;
- le fait que le fnanchissement du Seuil constitue une contnainte
beaucoup pltrs faible que celle qui d6cq'rle du nespect des panit6s
bi latdnales.
4. !.-g"-!16-:4jll1s--d-e-ggg'l-t-L:9*j91jl9f  gl-e-i-93[t-J9!E-9!S9gc-o-{:
f inanci-er-l-go-v-*.!91gr-el  n ront pas 6td ut i I isds'
5. w31l'-Tji93"-og-999n  -s -P-')loJ:
Les changements de parit6 sont un dbs instrurhents du sysGme' lls ont
6t 6  relativement nombneux (Z) et les dcarts convenus entne les couns
pivots bilat6raux ont panfois 6t6 de g A lO 
qla 
'
L.e S. M. E  neste incomplet'
A.  ll nlinclut pas, ou pas complbtementr toutes les monnaies commu-
nautai nes .
a) Depuis |g?g, la mange def|uctuation de |a Lit est fix6e \ 6Io.
Les autonit6s italiennes poLlnsuivent depuis l9?9 une politique de stabi li-
sation et mame de.l6gEne augmentation du taux de change n6el de leur
m onnaie. ll nren neste pas moirs pnobable que la moins bonne perfon-
m ance italienne en matibne de stabilisation slexplique aussi sans dqlte
pan la moindne contnainte i  l14ustement gue constitue ltamplitude'di la
mange. de f luctuation'
, 
b) La 5 est, depuis Ironigine absente du m6canisme de charrge
et dlintenvention. Bien qulelle pn6sente des risques -  maitnisables - la
panticipationdeIataunaitessentie||ementtnoisavantages:-6-
!
'- elle complEterait  de manibre d6cisive tn des m6canisma les
plus n6cessaines et les plus contraignants de discipline commune,
de corvengence et de consolidation du march6 commun i
-  elle nenfoncenait la dimension et la crCdibilit6 du S.M. E
ainsi que son pqlvoin de n6gociation vis-l-vis de lterct6nlolfr I
- elle donner.ait au Royaume-Uni ltatout dtune monnaie ins6n6e
dans un m6canisme de stabilit6 rendant compte continOment des  l
donn6es 6conomiques fcnda,frilmtal es.
c) La drachme est elle aussi bbsente du S. M. E.
B.  Les relations ext6nieunes du svstlme
La coondination des politiqr,res des membnes du S. M. E vis-e-vis
des autnes gnandes monnaies, et notanrment du $, slest am6lion6e  :
les banques centrales 6ctrangent en permanence des informatioris ;  des 
:
aetionsconcert6esponctue[|esdegestiondesmanctr6sdeschanges
ont 6td effectu6es ; des ndflexiqrs sq,tt en couns sun la manibre de r6agir  .'
de fagon coh6nente A des 6volutions intennationales pndoccupantes.  ''
Mais, contnairement A ce qui 6tait pr.6vu dans les n6solutlons
de Bn$me et de Bnuxelles, le S. M. E  nlest pas encone panvenu A d6tinir
une attitude commune vis-A-vis du $. Ceci tient I deux causes pninei'-
pales : 
,
- le d6sint6r8t des autonit6s arndnicaines & lt6eBrd Cu taux
de change du $ ;
- la diff6nen'ce des situations des membnes du S. M. E.
vis-A-vis du $, ll€volution de cette monnaie ayant des effets
6conomiques vani6s selon les pays, et une monnaie du systbrne
ayant le r0le particulien  de monnaie de n6senve.I
-7-
C. Le d6veLoppement de IrCcu sur Les marchds privds
Lr6cu connait un succds grandissant auprds des opdrateurs priv6s. Lrampteur
du marche de Irdcu i  court terme atteindnait 10 miLIiards dr6cus; [e
vo[ume des 6missions A long terme sr6[6ve e 3]  miLLiards dr6cusl Lrencours
des cr6djts bancaires syndique 6 moyen terme serait de 2 miLLiards dr6cus.
La Comm.ission, dans une communication  du mois de mai 198 (1)' a expos6
Les avantages quretLe verrait A un d6veLoppement de Lrusage privd de Ir6cu.
En tout 6tat de cause, Le d6veLoppement de cet usage appeLLe une r6ponse
pLus homogdne des Etats membres aux besoins du march6
cgNcLUsIoN :  '
Le biLan de 5 ann6es drexistence du S.M.E. est largement positif:
- des progrds ont et6 accompLis dans [a voie de La convergence des
poLiiiques 6conomiques, m6me si ces progres doivent €tre consoLid6s;
- dans Lrendemb[e, Le fonctionnement des m6canjsmes a 6t6 satisfaisant,
des prob[dmes continuant i  se poser en ce qui concerne notamment
Ltusage officieL de lr6cu et Ia pratique des interventions;
-  Le systeme demeune incompLet : toutes [es monnaies europ6ennes -nry
partjcipent pas; La coordination  des poLitiques en mati6re de taux
de change a ir6gard des pays tiers demeure insuffisanterLe  d6veLoppement
spontan6 de Lr6cu priv6 est encore entrave
(1) COM(83) 274 du ?4 nai 1983 et P - 45 "Promotion du r6Le international
de L r6cu".
RappeL: principaLes propositions faites 16cemment par La Commission dans
Les domaines mon6taires et financier :
,  Approfondissement du SystAme Mon6taire Europ6en C0M(82) 133 finat
du 18.3.1982
Int6gration financidre coM(83) 207'finaL du 18.4.83 et P -  32